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Case No. 18126 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, was charged with 
second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah. Code· Ann.,:·§ 76-5-203 ( 1973), as amended, and was tried 
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree 
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years, and 
which may be for life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's 
convict ion and. sentence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ryan Nielsen, a University of Utah police officer, 
finished his work shift at 2:00 a.m. on March 15, 1981 (T. 2, 
3). Driving home in his personal car, Officer Nielsen 
proceeded westbound along Sunnyside Avenue to 1400 East where 
he noticed a yellow vehicle parked on the south side of the 
street underneath a street light (T. 3, 4). As he passed the 
car, Officer Nielsen noticed three persons standing nearby, 
one of whom was not wearing a shirt (T. 4). Becoming 
suspicious, Officer Nielsen executed a u-turn and proceeded 
eastbound along Sunnyside Avenue whereupon he saw the 
appellant, whose hands were covered with blood, dragging a 
body from the car (T. 5, 6). The officer again executed a 
U-turn, and as he proceeded westbound, passing the yellow car 
a third time, he observed appellant placing the body on the 
ground (T. 6, 7). 
Officer Nielsen then drove to a 7-11.store located 
at 800 South and 1300 East where he encountered the store 
manager as he was sweeping the parking lot (T. 11). Not 
leaving his car, the officer told the manager that he needed 
help and asked him to call the police (T. 11). At this 
instant the yellow car containing appellant drove by the 7-11 
store headed westbound along 800 South, and Officer Nielsen 
left the parking lot and followed the car from a distance of 
100 feet (T. 11, 12). The car stopped at about 500 East and 
-2-
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800 south and all three occupants got out (T. 12). Officer 
Nielsen then left his car, approached the three occupants, 
identified himself as a police officer and ordered them to lie 
on the ground (T. 11, 12). All three complied with the order, 
but moments later appellant jumped up and ran off (T. 13). 
Officer Nielsen gave chase, apprehending the appellant two 
blocks away following a brief struggle (T. 13). 
Evidence adduced at trial indicates that the victim, 
Samuel Beare, was a temporary guest at an apartment located at 
269 Kelsey Avenue that was currently occupied by Mary Holloway 
and Charles Crick (T. 139, 140). On the evening of March 14, 
1981,. Mary Holloway, Charles Crick, the victim and the 
appellant were present at the Kelsey Avenue apartment. 
Apparently ~ngered by the victim's mistreatment of a dog in 
the apartment,· the appellant threatened the victim, and when 
the mistreatment continued, he hit the victim, knocking him to 
the floor (T. 117). In this position, the appellant continued 
his assault, joined by Mary Holloway and Charles Crick, that 
resulted in the victim's death (T. 116-118). 
At trial, Dr. Guery Flores, a forensic pathologist, 
testified. that the victim's face had sustained numerous 
contusions and lacerations (T. 61). In addition, he found 
fifteen stab wounds on the victim's body, thirteen wounds to 
the thorax and two wounds to the abdomen (T. 61, 62). Each 
wound was about six inches deep and each wound could have 
caused death (T. 62, 66). 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
Appellant argues that no evidence exists linking him 
to the victim's death, and thus.his guilty verdict for second-
degree murder is supported by a quantum of evidence that is 
insufficient as a matter of law. Therefore, the appellant 
concludes, a reversal of his conviction is mandated. 
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim, 
this Court accords great deference to conclusions reached by 
the jury in matters solely within its province: 
It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is 
not within the prerogative of this Court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the 
factfinder. This Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (emphasis 
added). Thus, this Court's function is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, or the 
credibility of witnesses. State v. Lamm, supra: State v. 
Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979). In State v. Logan, Utah, 
563 P.2d 811, 814 (1977), this Court recast its review 
-4-
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standard in rather succinct terms: "[U]nless there is a clear 
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld." 
Furthermore, this Court has stated that its review of the 
evidence and those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom 
will be conducted in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980). 
In addition, the defendant bears the burden of establishing 
that the evidence presented at his trial was so inconclusive 
arrl insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt concerning his guilt for the crime charged. 
Id. at 1168. 
Those.· facts marshalled by appellant in his brief and 
his cons.tr.uction of those facts simply fail to cast doubt on 
the appropriateness of his guilty verdict for second-degree 
murder. Quite to the contrary, the lower court record 
contains overwhelming evidence pointing to his participation 
in the murder. Indeed, those facts in the record and 
/' 
reasonable inferences deduced therefrom would convince a 
reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was 
guilty of second-degree murder. 
A brief review of the evidence reveals the 
following: It is undisputed that on March 14, 1981, 
appellant, angered by the victim's treatment of a dog, hit him 
with his fist and knocked him to the floor (T. 117). While 
the victim was in this condition, the appellant continued 
-s-
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the beating and was later joined by Mary Holloway and Charles 
Crick (T. 117, 118). Later, in the early morning hours of 
March 15, 1981, appellant was seen dragging the body of the 
victim from a car, his hands and body covered with blood (T. 
4-6). During trial, the forensic pathologist testified that 
fifteen knife wounds had been inflicted on the victim's thorax 
and abdomen, each wound fatal (T. 61, 62, 66). He further 
testified that the wounds were inflicted at different angles, 
indicating that the victim either moved during the attack or 
the assailant moved around the victim's body as the attack 
progressed (T. 63). The latter inference is more reasonable 
in light of the earlier vicious beating that must have 
incapacitated the victim, and in light of other testimony 
presented by the pathologist that the victim's blood contained 
high concentrations of alcohol and other sedative and hypnotic 
drugs (T. 117, 118, 69, 70). Thus, the reasonable inference 
is that the victim remained motionless while the assailant 
moved around the body stabbing at will. Note, however, that a 
multiple party attack with one knife, each member stabbing the 
victim in turn, would be consistent with this result and would 
explain the variety of wounds, each with a different angle. 
Furthermore, this explanation is all the more reasonable when 
it is remembered that the initial beating of the victim was 
conducted jointly by the appellant and his two accomplices. 
-6-
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On March 15, 1981, a knife covered with blood was 
found at about 800 South 1200 East, a location adjacent to the 
route appellant took after the victim's body had been dropped 
(T. 104, 88). In addition, the appellant had admitted owning 
a knife (T. 119). Further examination and analysis of the 
knife·revealed that the blood found thereon was consistent 
with blood removed from the victim (T, 89), and that the knife 
could have caused the wounds inflicted on his body (T. 62, 
63). 
On March 23, 1981, the Kelsey Avenue apartment was 
searched, revealing a mattress soaked in blood and nearby 
walls spotted with blood (T. 80, 81). Samples from the 
mattress and wall were removed (T. 80, 81). Later analysis 
showed that the chemical characteristics of the blood removed 
from the mattress were consistent with characteristics of the 
victim's blood and that the blood found on the wall was 
consistent with the appellant's blood (T. 90, 91, 81, 93). 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-203(1) (1973), as amended, 
states in part: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another~ or 
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another~ or 
(c) Acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to 
-7-
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human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another. 
• • • 
Clearly, as a minimum, appellant's conduct falls within the 
ambit of§ 76-5-203(l)(b), supra. The evidence summarized 
above shows that appellant attacked the victim intending to 
cause at least serious bodily injury. The nature and extent 
of the victim's facial wounds are conclusive on that issue. 
Next, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that 
appellant, in concert with the others, stabbed the victim, 
opening wounds that were separately fatal. Certainly this 
would be deemed an act clearly dangerous to human life and 
which caused the death of the victim. 
In sum, appellant has not carried his burden of 
demonstrating the insufficiency and inconclusiveness of the 
evidence. To the contrary, the evidence presented by 
respondent, together with reasonable inferences deduced 
therefrom, would compel a reasonable person to conclude that 
/ 
appellant was guilty of second-degree murder. Therefore, 
appellant cannot prevail on this claim. 
POINT II 
ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM WAS 
NOT ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
During trial, respondent moved for the admission of 
six color photographs, each depicting the victim as he was 
-8-
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found at 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue (T. 34). The trial court 
admitted five of the photographs over appellant's objection to 
four of them (T. 34, 35). 
The appellant argues that by admitting the 
photographs the trial court abused its discretion because the 
photographs lacked probative value and they merely served to 
inflame the passions of the jury, citing State v. Poe, 21 Utah 
2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968). Poe, however, is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case. There, the defendant 
was convicted of first-degree murder and he appealed 
contending, inter alia, that the lower court abused its 
discretion~in admitting color slides depicting the victim's 
autopsy. The slides depicted stages of the autopsy as parts 
of the victim's skull and brain were removed. Prior to the 
admission of the color slides, black and white photographs had 
been introduced showing the victim lying in bed with two 
bullet wounds in his head. In resolving the defendant's 
claim, this Court adopted a balancing test: 
Initially, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether the inflammatory nature of such 
slides is outweighed by their probative 
value with respect to an issue in fact. 
If the latter they may be admitted even 
though gruesome. 
441 P.2d at 515. Applying this standard, this Court reversed 
the defendant's conviction and remanded· his case for a new 
-9-
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trial because any facts that could have been adduced from the 
autopsy slides had been established by prior medical testimony 
a~ thus the slides had no probative value. 441 P.2d at 515. 
In the instant case the color photographs did not 
depict details of the victim's autopsy that could have been 
established by appropriate medical testimony. Rather, the 
photos showed the nature of the victim's wounds, the 
surrounding area where the victim had been deposited, and the 
depravity of the appellant's assault upon the victim. 
In State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 
(1968), the defendant was charged with first-degree murder but 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The defendant appealed 
his conviction contending that he had been prejudiced by the 
introduction of two gruesome color pictures depicting the 
murder in which sexual mutilation had also occurred. This 
Court noted that a photo of a murder victim is not per se 
inadmissible because of its gruesomeness. Rather, there nis 
no reason for excluding it from evidence if it is otherwise 
competent and relevant." 443 P.2d at 392. Affirming the 
defendant's conviction, this Court held that the photos were 
properly admitted because they were relevant in demonstrating 
a depraved mind which was required for the applicable first-
degree murder statute (Utah Code Ann., § 76-30-3 (1953)). See 
also: State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632 (1972) 
(photos of the victim were properly admitted because they were 
-10-
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of probative value in illustrating the nature of the attack on 
the victim where malice was an issue); State v. Poe, 24 Utah 
2d 355, 471 P.2d 870 (1970) (two black and white photos 
depicting the victim's death by gunshot wounds were held 
properly admitted for the purpose of showing the nature and 
degree .of the homicide). 
In the instant case, appellant was charged with 
second-degree murder in violation of S 76-5-203(1). Paragraph 
(c) under that statute requires that the respondent prove 
appellant acted under "circumstances evidencing a depraved 
ind if fe rence to human life. • ft Thus, these color photos • • 
were probative of an issue in fact; vis., the appellant's 
depraved indifference to human life. 
Finally, some of the photos are valuable in 
describing ·the .. area at which the victim was dropped. 
Particularly, these photos show the position of the victim in 
relation to a sidewalk adjacent to Sunnyside Avenue and a 
nearby parking lot. Clearly, the probative value of these 
pictures outweighs their inflammatory nature and thus was 
properly admitted by the trial court. 
POIMT III 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS 
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL. 
Recall that the appellant fled from his car and was 
apprehended two blocks away by Officer Nielsen. The following 
-11-
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testimony dealt with Officer Nielsen's effort to obtain some 
assistance from passers-by: 
Q. Who was present besides--
A. Myself and Mr. Garcia and the indivi-
dual that was walking down the 
street. 
Q. And what did you tell this individual? 
A. I told him I was a police officer and 
that I needed some help, and would he 
go call the police. 
Q. There were three people present? 
A. Yes. He never stopped. Continued to 
walk away. 
Q. After you made that statement to him, 
did Mr. Garcia say anything? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say to him. 
A. Said, "I will kill you." 
(T. 15). Apparently, appellant's verbal threat was intended 
to thwart any third party assistance that would aid in his 
apprehension. To Officer Nielsen's answer, defense counsel 
raised an objection which was sustained by the trial court (T. 
15). Ap:oellant contends that this statement, "I will kill 
you," was hearsay evidence that tended to paint him as a 
person predisposed to commit murder, and thus in addition 
violated Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant's argument, however, is built on a foundation of 
-12-
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sand, for appellant attempts to assign as error to the trial 
court his own defense counsel's negligence. 
The form of questioning above clearly indicates that 
defense counsel had sufficient time and warning to anticipate 
the witness' answer and to interpose an objection to the 
hearsay testimony: 
Usually, in the taking of testimony of a 
witness an objection is apparent as soon 
as the question is asked, since the 
question is likely to indicate that it 
calls for inadmissible evidence. Then 
counsel must, if opportunity affords, 
state his objection before the witness 
answers. 
McCormick, Law of Evidence§ 52, at 113 (2d Ed. 1972). 
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel was not afforded 
sufficient opportunity to interpose a timely objection, then a 
motion to strike should have been made: 
In all these cases, an •after objection• 
may be stated as soon as the ground 
appears. The proper technique for such an 
objection is to phase a motion to strike 
out the objectionable ~vidence, and to 
request an instruction to the jurv to 
disregard the evidence. 
Id. § 52 at 113 (emphasis added). Furthermore, "where 
objection to testimony is sustained, but no motion to strike 
is made, the answer becomes part of the record." State v. 
Abbey, 13 Ariz. App. 55, 474 P.2d 62, 63 n. 1 (1970). 
-13-
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Here, the record contains the answer because 
defense counsel failed to make a motion to strike, not because 
of any error in the trial court's reception of evidence. 
Thus, appellant's claim lacks merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction for second-degree murder was 
supported by sufficient evidence. Furthermore, the photos of 
the victim were properly admitted at trial because their 
probative value outweighed their inflammatory effect. 
Finally, the trial court committed no error in its reception 
of evidence. Therefore, respondent respectfully requests this 
Court affirm appellant's conviction. 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to John w. 
Ebert, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 
3rd day of November, 1982. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 















Case No. 18126 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The respondent, having heretofore filed a brief in 
this matter on November 3, 1982, respectfully submits the 
following Supplement to Brief of Respondent. The following 




RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
Although the evidence presented at trial, as recited 
in Respondent's brief, was clearly sufficient to support 
appellant's conviction for second-degree murder under 
subsection (b) of S 76-5-203(1), it was also sufficient under 
subsections (a) and (c) of that statute. Appellant's conduct, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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as established by the evidence and reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, could support the conclusion that he intended 
the death of Sam Beare;or acted with the awareness that his 
conduct was reasonably certain.to cause the death of the 
. . . 
victim. § 76-5-203(l)(a). Further, his conduct in beating 
the victim and participating in further attacks on the victim, 
I 
including the infliction.of 15 stab wounds, certainly shows he 
acted with depraved indifference to human life, created a 
grave risk of death to the victim, and caused the victim's 
death. § 76-5-203(l)(c). The jury was instructed on each of 
the subsections of the statute and could reasonably have based 
their verdict on any of the three (R. 93, 94, 96, 97). 
In addition, respondent submits that it was not 
necessary for the State to prove that appellant personally 
inflicted all or any of the knife wounds which were determined 
to be the cause of .death in order to be properly convicted of 
second-degree murder. Under Utah Code Ann., S 76-2-202 (1973 
as amended), any person: 
~ 
••• acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
The jury was so instructed in this case (R. 92). 
Although there is no direct evidence of how Samuel 
Taylor Beare, IV, was killed, the believable circumstantial 
-2-
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evidence points to the inference that appellant initiated a 
fist fight with the victim which escalatea into a brutal 
beating and a fatal stabbing by appellant, Charles Crick and 
Mary Holloway. There was no evidence presented at trial which 
would indicate that appellant withdrew after beginning the 
fight. There was evidence that the murder weapon matched the 
. 
description of appellant's knife (T. 119) which he gave to 
Dianna Poor, requesting that she try to find it. The knife 
was found near where the victim's body was removed from the 
car and dropped on the ground by appellant (T. 5-7, 105). 
Although appellant was covered with blood at the time of his 
first contact with Officer Nielson,.the officer noted that he 
did not notice blood on either Crick or Holloway at the time 
he attempted to.apprehend them (T. 5, 10, 127-128). Finally, 
the fact that appellant had his shirt off despite the cold 
weather and the fact that most of the blood was gone from the 
victim's body before it was dragged out of the car and dumped 
(T. 4-6, 42-43) allow the inference that the blood all over 
appellant was not solely from his dragging the body out of the 
car but was from his contact with the victim at the time of 
the killing. All this allows the inference that even if 
appellant did not personally inflict stab wounds on the 
victim, he supplied his knife to the others for that purpose 
and thus intentionally aided, encouraged or instigated the 
actual killing. 
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A more reasonable inference remains that appellant 
directly participated with the others in inflicting the 
beating and the stab woun~~· 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS 
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL. 
The statement by Officer Nielson relating that 
appellant said "I will kill you" to a passerby who had been 
requested by the officer to call the police (T. 15) was not 
hearsay and did not violate Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The statement was not admitted to show the 
truth of the matter stated, but merely to show the statement 
was made. Thus, it was non-hearsay. 
Even if it was hearsay, the statement would have 
been admissible under Rule 63(12) as: 
••• a statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind • • • when such a 
mental or physical condition is in issue 
or is relevant to prove or explain acts or 
conduct of the declarant. 
In this case, the statement was relevant to show, when 
considered with appellant's flight from the point at which the 
police officer first attempted to apprehend him, that 
appellant's state of mind at the time of the threat to the 
bystander was consistent with his being a persQn who was 
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guilty of a crime and had been caught. The statement was thus 
admissible to show his .state of mind even if it was hearsay. 
I. 
The statement si~~Pl.Y does not run afoul of Rules 47 
or SS of the Utah Rules of Evidence since it was not 
introduced as evidence of appellant's character in general or 
as evidence of some prior specif~¢ criminal act or civil 
wrong. Rule 45 is similarly unavailing since the evidence was 
relevant, as indicated above, and was not unduly prejudicial 
to appellant when viewed in context with all the other 
evidence adduced at trial. 
Although not noted in the prior brief of Respondent, 
it should be noted that the allegedly objectionable statement 
was objected to immediately after it was made and the trial 
court sustained the objection (T. 15). Immediately following 
this a discussion occurred at the bench; however, nothing 
further was stated concerning a motion to strike or to 
admonish the jury. Another discussion as to the statement 
/ 
occurred later in the trial in which defense counsel clarified 
his objection but again made no motion to strike or for a 
mistrial. The trial court indicated he would rule on the 
matter the next day of trial if he needed to (T. 45-46). 
Nothing else was said after that point concerning the 
statement. Thus, respondent urges this Court ~o find that 
even if the statement should not have been admitted, appellant 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failed to preserve the issue for this appeal by failur~ to 
. 
make a timely motion to strike or to admonish the jury to 
disregard the statement. -.. ~- .. 
1982. 
- . 
Respectfully submitted ·this 7th day of December, 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Supplement to Brief of Respondent, 
postage prepaid, to John w. Ebert, Attorney for Appellant, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, this 7th day of December, 1982. 
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